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This note describes and investigates an equilibrium model of a service
market in which customers search among many firms for ones offering
acceptable combinations of money price and expected waiting time. Although
neither firms nor customers possess market power, the noncooperative
equilibrium of the model is inefficient: Forcing customers to be more
selective in their choices of suppliers can produce Pareto improvements in
welfare. This result is due to an externality, in queue accession
decisions, which others have identified in related contexts..
A Note on.the Inefficiency of Competitive Markets for Quality Goods
John R, Schroeter*
This note reviews an equilibrium model of a competitive, market in which
quality plays an important role. The specific quality dimension discussed
is the wait required of customers to obtain an otherwise homogeneous
service, although the results could be interpreted more generally. The
model, itself, is not entirely new: It differs in only a few respects from
one presented by De Vany and Saving [1983]. The analysis here investigates
the welfare properties of the model, an aspect which' has not been examined
satisfactorily. The result is that equilibria of the model are ineffi
cient.^ Due to the presence of an externality, market interventions can be
designed to yield Pareto improvements in welfare. Section I states the
model, first briefly in intuitive terms, then formally. In the interests of
brevity and simplicity, the discussion is limited to those features needed
to establish the desired result. In particular, a detailed characterization
of firms' decision rules is omitted. Section II explains the nature of the
externality and makes use of some simulation results to demonstrate the
inefficiency of equilibrium. Section III briefly summarizes the main
finding and relates it to similar results in the literature.
I. THE MODEL
A large number of firms are engaged in the provision of a particular
service. Since customer arrivals occur randomly in time, service is time
consuming, and capacity is finite, each firm typically will face a queue of
customers waiting to be served. The only quality dimension that may vary
across firms is the length of time that customers must wait to secure the
service. Customers' preferences with respect to this quality dimension are
consistent with Che goal of securing one unit of the service at the lowest
possible full price, the seller's monetary fee plus the anticipated waiting
time weighted by a common time value. Customers have an incentive,
therefore, to search across firms for ones offering desirable combinations
of service fees and queue lengths. Search is costly, however, so
customers' optimal search strategies will reflect the trade-off between the
costs and expected benefits of continued search. Firms take aggregate
demand and customers' search strategies as given in setting a.fee and
choosing a service capacity to maximize expected profits per unit time.
Aggregate demand is a decreasing function of the expected full cost (service
fee plus waiting time cost plus search cost) of securing one unit of the
service.
The Queueing Theoretic Model of Service
The stochastic operation of a representative firm is described by the
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M/M/l/N model of elementary queueing theory. Let the firm's customer
arrival process be Poisson with mean interarrival time 1/X. Suppose that
service times are independently, identically distributed negative
exponential random variables with mean 1/S, so that the average service
rate, or service capacity, is S. Arriving customers who find N-1 or fewer
customers already in the system, that is, in the queue or being served, will
join the queue whereas those who find N or more customers ahead of them will
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balk. The steady state solution to the model is a set of system size
probabilities; q^ for n = 0, 1, 2, ..., N; which can be thought of as the
limiting proportions of time spent in each system state on an infinitely
long sample path. These probabilities can be written as functions of the
parameters p, S, and N where p = X/S. From these, the following results can
readily be deduced,^
= Prob {N customers in the system}
= Prob {An arrival will balk} = —- (1)
, N+1
1-p
The proportion of arrivals who join, the queue is steady state
rate of queue accessions, X', is given by:
X- = (l-q^) X= • (2)
1-p
The expected waiting time for queue joiners, W, is given by:
_ 1 l-CN^-Dp^-fNp"''^
® (1-P«) (1-P) ^'
The Customers* Problem
Imagine a group of firms, firms of type i, say, each of which charges a
price of p^, employs service capacity S^, experiences an arrival rate of X^,
•and faces a balking value of An arrival to a type i firm who becomes
the n*"^ in the system faces a conditional (upon system size) expected full
price of P^^ = p^^+v-n/S^ where v is the constant time value, P^^, like all
conditional expectations, is a random variable. Denote its mean by P, its
distribution by F.(• ) and notice that F.(*) will depend on p., S., N. , and
1 1 ' 1 ' 1 '
X^. Suppose that this full price distribution is known to all customers.
If a potential customer were to search among type i firms, making
independent, sequential drawings from the distribution he/she. would
do so using a search strategy that minimized the expected full cost of
acquiring one unit of the service.^ Let the dollar equivalent cost of
sampling a firm be equal to a,^ It is well known that optimal search
strategies in this setting are of the reservation price form. A standard
search theory exercise produces the following implicit definition of the
8optimal reservation price:
R.
/ ^xdF.(x)
o = F.(R.)[R.- ] (4)
R^, the reservation full price, is related to , the balking value or
reservation queue length, via:
N.
R. = p. + V (5)
L ^1 S.
I
Fj^(Rj^) is the probability that a conditional expected full price drawn from
F,(• ) is acceptable. This is the event of a queue accession, hence
Ri
F-(R.) = l-q„ . Finally, / xdF.(x)/F.(R.) is the expected full price
L 1 N. •' o L L I
L
conditional on Pj^ < This is simply p^ + v-W^. With these
substitutions, equation (4) can be rewritten as:
N.
L
sT
1 L
9which, using (1) and (3) becomes:
N. N. N.+l
l-p " l-(N.+l)p. V Up ^
^ =—Vrrt"!
"• i-Pi ' (i-Pi (i-pi)
The minimal value of the expected full cost of acquiring one unit of the
service will be:
C. = p. + am. + vW.
11 1 1
where m^ = 1/F(R^) is the expected number of searches undertaken.This
can be written as:
N.+l N. N.+l
l-p. ' 1-(n +1) p V N
= —N— i—^
i-p. ' ' [i-p. ') (i-pj
Customers know the distributions of conditional expected full prices for all
types of firms, and so can calculate and for each type. Customers
will only search within those groups offering the lowest values for C.
available in the market.
The Firms' Problem
The objective function of firms is expected profits per unit time.
Expected revenue per unit time is simply pj^ times the steady state rate of
queue accessions, Expected costs per unit time are assumed to be a
function of and service capacity, S^, In view of equation (2), which
specifies X as a function of X^, S^, and N,, expected profits per unit time
can be written as a function of these variables as well as p.. Firms
choose Pj^ and while taking as given the nature of search behavior by
customers and the market determined expected full cost of acquiring the
service, For any choices of values for and pj^, equation (6) and
equation (7) with Cj^ = Cwill determine values for X^ and , These
constraints on the representative firm's choice setting allow the expected
profit rate function to be expressed in terms of p^, S^, and ^ alone.
Assuming that optimal values of p. and S. exist and are unique, they can be
expressed as functions of C alone. Denote these as:
Pi = (8)
Si = S(C) (9)
Moreover, since all firms have the same cost function and all face the same-
value of C, all will choose the same price and capacity. Consequently the
"i" subscripts wilL be dropped hereafter. '
Aggregate Demand
The model, to this point, consists of equations (6), (7), (8), and (9).
To close the model, it remains to introduce the aggregate demand function
and specify the relationship between the arrival rate of customers to the
market as a whole and to the representative firm. Customer arrivals to the
market are assumed to be a Poisson process with expected interarrival time
1/A , where A is a decreasing function of the market determined expected full
' c • • '..12cost of acquiring one unit:
A = A(^) (10)
In steady state equilibrium, the aggregate rate of searching will be MX,
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where M is the fixed number of firms. For this rate of searching to be
supported by the aggregate arrival process, it is necessary that Am = MX
where m, as previously defined, is the expected number of searches per
customer. This condition can be written as:
A 1 ^+1p ^ ^ (11)
^ SM , N ^ ^
1-p
The model is now complete. It consists of equations (6), (7), (8),
(9), (10), and (11) with endogenous variables C, p, S, N, p, and A.
II. INEFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIUM
This section will demonstrate that the model's individually rational
search strategy (characterized, for our purposes, by the value for N which
solves equation (6)) is socially inefficient,^^ Greater total surplus can
be derived by imposing the requirement that all customers search more
intensively (adopt lower reservation queue lengths) than is consistent with
individual optimization. The reason for this incompatability of individual
and social objectives is an external diseconomy in customers' queue
accession decisions. Customers who are indifferent between joining a queue
of a particular length and searching further could balk, leaving themselves
no worse off, while improving the distribution of queue lengths for
subsequent arrivals.
Suppose that a central authority were to intervene in equilibrium by
simply requiring that all customers search with a lower reservation queue
length. How things would change as a result is a complicated question and
one which we are not equipped to address since we have not explored the
details of the firms' pricing and capacity choice rules. To effect the
demonstration of the inefficiency of equilibrium more simply, we will
consider an even more heavy-handed method of intervention.^^ The central
authority will impose a lower balking value and simultaneously suspend
firms' decision rules. Firms will be directed to maintain the same service
capacity as in the initial equilibrium and to adjust price so that C, the
expected full cost of obtaining the service, remains constant. Since firms
will not choose p and S to maximize expected profits per unit time, the
specific forms of equations (8) and (9) are not a concern. Since C remains
cpnstant, A will remain unchanged regardless of the form of the demand
function (10), Moreover, since neither the steady state rate of provision
of the service nor the expected full cost are affected, customers, as a
class, will be indifferent with respect to the intervention. Thus any
increase in surplus that might obtain will accrue to firms.
With C, hence A, and S held constant, equation (11) will dictate the'
response in p to the imposed reduction in N. One can easily show that (II)
implies:
^ = (l-p)p^"^^lnp . Q for p 4= 1,
. N= 1, 2.... ^^2)
As the balking value goes down, for fixed M, S, and A, customers search more
times on average so X (hence p) goes up. To see what change in p will be
required to maintain constant C, consider the effect that the change in N,
and the attendant response in p, will have on expected waiting and search
costs per customer. Use equation (7) to express these in "search
equivalents" as:
.. c. 5ie = „
" 1-pN
or, using (11):
C =i p + i sw
where a - A/S*M and 0 = a*S/v. The total derivative of C with respect to N
is:
dC _ 1 dp ^ 1 8W ^ ^ 3W dp
dN " a dN "*• 0 ^ Tn " 3p dN J
The parameter a is the overall arrival rate divided by the industry
service rate. Clearly this will be positive and must be less than one for a
steady state equilibrium to exist. The parameter 3 is the cost of one
search divided by the value of the expected duration of service, 3 can thus
T^e thought of an an index of search costs relative to waiting costs and can
assume any positive value. It can be shown that S 9W/8N.and S 9W/8p are
both positive. Recalling that dp/dN < 0, expression (13) fails to
unambiguously sign dC/dN in general. ^ This is not surprising, of course,
since, for a given aggregate arrival rate, a decrease in N will decrease
waiting costs and increase search costs. The effect on the sum of waiting
and search costs is unclear.
S TTi? + S (13)
To demonstrate the inefficiency of equilibrium, we need consider only
the effects on waiting plus search costs of a change in the equilibrium
balking value. That is, our interest is restricted to the signs of dC/dN
evaluated at equilibrium values of p and N. For arbitrary values of a and
3, corresponding equilibrium values of p and N are determined by equations
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(6) and (11). Since the system (6) and (II) is highly nonlinear, further
progress along an analytical course is difficult. One can easily proceed,
however, through resort to simulation methods, Ihe table displays, for
several pairs of values for a and 3, equilibrium values for p and N,
determined by (6) and (11), and the associated values of dC/dN. Note that
dC/dN is positive in equilibrium, at least for the wide ranges of values for
a and 3 examined. Thus a decrease in N would reduce C (waiting costs
decrease more than search costs increase) and allow p to be increased
without changing C, S, A, M, and hence X' are unchanged so firms costs are
unchanged. As noted above, consumers are as well off as before the
intervention since C and A have not changed. Yet p has increased so
expected profits per unit time are greater for each firm. In equilibrium,
the probability of a balk, q^, varies directly with a and inversely with
• 19
3, Moreover, the table reveals that the equilibrium values of dC/dN vary
directly with q^. The gain in efficiency to be derived by reducing the.
balking value is greater the more frequently the balking value is
encountered.
III. SUMMARY
In the model presented here, customers search independently among many
firms for ones offering suitably low full prices of service. Firms, too,
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act independently in selecting prices and service capacities to maximize
their expected profit rates. Moreover, individual agents possess no market
power: Customers regard the distribution of full prices as beyond their
influence and firms view the market determined expected full cost of service
and the aggregate rate of customer arrivals as parameters. Yet the
equilibrium of the model is inefficient. This result is due to an
externality in customers* queue accession decisions. An individual's
criterion for joining a queue does not reflect the costs to be imposed on
subsequent arrivals. Search externalities of this general sort, and the
consequent non-optimality of equilibria, have been identified in other
20settings. Examples include papers by Diamond [1981 and 1982]. The
contribution of this note has been to demonstrate the presence of the
phenomenon in a queueing.theoretic, search-equilibrium model of a
competitive market for a quality good.
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simulation Results.
a B P N %
dC/dN
0.2 0.25 0.223 1.363 0.103 0.529
0.4 0.25 0.512 1.503 0.219 0.806
0.6 0.25 0.904 1.720 0.336 1.029
00
o
0.25 1.465 2.143 0.454 1.324
0.2 0150 0.212 1.665 0.060 0.153
0.4 0.50 0.467 1.867 0.145 0.266
0.6 0.50 0.788 2.168 0.238 0.381
0.8 0.50 1.217 2.735 0.343 0.558
0.2 0.75 0.207 1.945 0.037 0.064
0.4 0.75 0.445 2.189 0.102 0.130
0.6 0.75 0.732 2.549 0.180 0.209
0.8 0.75 1.104 3.226 0.275 0.337
0.2 1.00 0.204 2.213 0.023 0.031
0.4 • 1.00 0.432 2.489 0.074 0.076
0.6 1.00 0.699 2.897 0.141 0.135
0.8 1.00 1,036 3.668 0.228 0.235
a For example, from an equilibrium with a = 0,8, 0 = 0.75, p = 1.104, and
N = 3.226 a 1 unit reduction in the balking value will reduce expected
search plus waiting costs per customer by 33.7% of the cost of one search,
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Notes
^Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Iowa State University.
My understanding of the issues discussed herein has been enhanced
through correspondence with Arthur De Vany.
^De Vany and Saving [1983] claim to prove that equilibria are
efficient, but their efficiency criterion is inappropriate in this setting,
(See note 14.)
2 ... .
In this application of Kendall's notation, the "M"'s identify the
interarrival and service times as i.i.d. negative exponential random
variables. The "1" indicates that there is one "server." The "N" signifies
that the system size is limited to N customers.
3 . . "It remains to be shown, of course, that a balking rule of this form
is, in fact, consistent with individually rational search strategies.
^Gross and Harris [1974] provide an excellent reference for those
results of the M/M/l/N model which are stated here without proof. The
discussion in this paper will be limited to the case p + 1, although this is
purely a matter of convenience. With p = 1, most of the expressions to
follow would still apply as long as they were interpreted as their limiting
values as p approaches 1.
Firms establish a price and a service rate that do not vary as the
length of the queue varies. We will ultimately see that, in equilibrium,
all firms make identical choices of p and S and face the same values for X
and N, For now, we allow that these variables may differ across firms. It
turns out to be a bit awkward, however, to think of each firm as having its
own unique set of values for p, S, X, and N since we will soon need to
imagine customers making independent sequential drawings from the
distributions of full prices implied by p, S, X, and N. Thus we model the
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population of firms as being comprised of several large "groups." Firms
differ across groups but are identical within groups,
^If certain types or groups of agents held a comparative advantage in
information acquisition, markets for their search services would arise. It
is conceivable that the externality identified here could be internalized
through this market mechanism. . The present analysis assumes that there is
no more efficient alternative to search conducted independently by each
customer.
• ^The full cost of observing the queue at a firm may have a time as well
as a money component. As long as the value of time is assumed constant,
nothing is lost by expressing the full cost of search in terms of its
equivalent dollar cost.
g
Equation (4) expresses equality between the expected marginal costs
and benefits of search. Since F^C*) is discontinuous, equation (4) may not
have a solution. More formally, is determined as
= sup {B: h(B) > o} where h(B) =Fj^(B) B- /^dF^(x)/Fj|^ (B) .
9 • .We will .proceed as if the value of which, for given Pj^, a, and S^,
solves (6) is the reservation queue length even though this value need not
be an integer. More formally, would be the greatest integer such that
the right hand side of (6) is at least as great as the left hand side,
^"^The number of independent drawings from Fj^(") before and including
the first success (the first drawing of a full price less than or equal to
is a random variable with the geometric distribution. Its mean, m. , is
equal to one over the probability of success in a single trial.
Firms in this model are not price takers in the conventional sense,
but "expected-full-cost-of-acquiring-one-unit takers," This is a small
departure from De Vany and Saving [1983] who apparently have in mind
"expected-full-price (P) taking" behavior by firms.
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12 . .
Customers, like firms, are risk neutral since their decision to
commence search depends only on the expected full cost of obtaining the
service. Since drawings from the full price distribution are independent,
the expected incremental cost of obtaining the service remains C after any
number of unsuccessful searches. Thus a customer, having once begun search,
will not stop until a conditional expected full price below the reservation
price is found. De Vany and Saving [1983] take aggregate demand to be a
function of the unconditional expected full price, P, rather than C, Thus
the costs of search do not affect aggregate demand in their specification.
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M could be made endogenous by adding a zero expected profit
condition. Note that searching customers regard observations of conditional
expected full prices to be independent drawings from the steady state
distribution of system sizes. If M is finite, these random variables would,
in fact, be correlated. An improbably long queue at one firm makes more
likely the observation of an improbably long queue at some other firm since
both of these events could be the result of a realized market demand rate
above the mean rate of A, Assume that M is sufficiently large so that
customers can ignore the potential for adapting their expectations of queue
length through learning based on this correlation, of system sizes across
firms.
14 . .De Vany and Saving claim to establish an efficiency result for their
model however their social benefit function takes no explicit account of
search costs. Thus, they miss the possibility for the beneficial tradeoffs
between search and waiting cost which can be effected through adoption of
alternate balking rules. Moreover, it's clear that search costs must be
included in the efficiency criterion if meaningful welfare properties are to
be established. Without this feature, the "optimum" of the model would
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involve all customers searching until an empty queue is found. Agents would
thereby economize on waiting costs to the greatest degree possible while
engaging in clearly wasteful expenditures of search resources,
^^The inefficiency of equilibrium result is robust. Our strategy here
is to demonstrate it using a simple special case,
^^The expressions for these derivatives are:
^ 3W _ -p'^[(l-p^) + NlnPj . „
N.2 ^
d-p")
9W (1-P^)^- N^P^~^(1-P)^
^ Jp ~r N ^ >0 for P =1= 1, N= 1,2,. ..
.d-p'') (1-P);
Expected waiting time increases as N increases and as X increases relative
to S.
The ambiguity does not disappear when use is made of the specific
expressions for dP/dN, 3w/9n, and 3w/9p.
18These can be rewritten, to involve only a, g, p, and N as:
B= Ttj _ 1-(N+1)P^ +
1-P^"^^ (1-P^) (1-p)
1-pN^l
(6)
P = — (11)
l-P*^
Since a and 0 involve variables that are endogenous to the full model, not
all pairs of values for these parameters are necessarily consistent with
equilibrium. The desired result actually obtains for all pairs of values
within the permissible ranges, and so for all equilibrium points.
1-9Greater relative demand intensity increases the frequency of balking
for fixed 0. Lower costs of search, relative to waiting, increases the
frequency of balking for fixed a,
20aA comment by Diamond to a paper by Mortensen [1982] also demonstrates
the presence of a similar externality In an equilibrium model of matching.
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Manski and Wright [1976] use simulation methods to expose the phenomenon in
a queueing model with a single customer queue. A paper by Naor [1969]
explores similar features of a partial equilibrium queueing model.
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